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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT

STATE OF ARIZONA, COUNTY OF YAVAPAI

STATE OF ARIZONA,

Plaintiff,

vs.

JAMES ARTHUR RAY,

Defendant.

V1300CR201080049

STATE'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S  
MOTION TO COMPEL DISCLOSURE  
OF BRADY MATERIAL

Division PTB

The State of Arizona, by and through Sheila Polk, Yavapai County Attorney, respectfully files this response to Defendant's Motion to Compel Disclosure of Brady Materials. As explained in the following Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the cases cited by Defendant in support of the premise that the State has the obligation to seek exculpatory information from persons or agencies outside the State's control do not support Defendant's Motion.

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. The Facts

1.) On October 8, 2009, Kirby Brown and James Shore passed away while participating in Defendant's sweat lodge ceremony. Ten days later, Lizbeth Neuman also passed away.

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1           2.)     After a four month investigation, the case was presented to a Yavapai County  
2 Grand Jury and Defendant was indicted on three counts of manslaughter.

3           3.)     Through media reports and in talking to certain family representatives, the State  
4 learned that some lawsuits or demands had been filed against Defendant, James Ray International,  
5 the Hamiltons and Angel Valley Spiritual Retreat Center. The State never obtained copies of the  
6 lawsuits or demands. The State has since learned that lawsuits and claims were filed by ten  
7 participants against Defendant, James Ray International, the Hamiltons, Angel Valley Spiritual  
8 Retreat Center and other entities. *See Exhibit A.* The State has also learned that the Hamiltons and  
9 Angel Valley Spiritual Retreat Center were sued by Ivan Lewis, Floyd Hand, William J. Bielecki,  
10 Sr., Jimmie Packhorse, Sr., and others. This lawsuit has been dismissed.

11           4.)     In arranging the defense interview of Stephen Ray, the State learned Mr. Ray had  
12 an attorney and arranged the interview through him. During the defense interview, the State  
13 learned that the Defendant had settled the claim filed by Stephen Ray and that a confidentiality  
14 agreement existed. Stephen Ray declined to provide any information to the parties about his  
15 lawsuit. The State respected that position and did not inquire further.

16           5.)     The State was aware that participants Sidney Spencer and Dennis Mehravar had  
17 filed lawsuits against Defendant and others, and had received expert witness reports pertaining to  
18 their civil case; these expert witness reports were disclosed to Defendant on November 23, 2010  
19 in the State's 19<sup>th</sup> Supplemental Disclosure.

20           6.)     On information and belief, Defendant, as a party to the lawsuit, was served in  
21 accordance with the law with the lawsuits and claims prior to commencement of this trial.  
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1 7.) On December 17, 2010, the State met with defense attorneys Luis Li and Tom  
2 Kelly at their request. During that meeting, Mr. Li told the State that the Defendant had settled the  
3 claims with the families of the three victims.

4 8.) To the State's knowledge, the Hamiltons and Angel Valley Spiritual Retreat  
5 Center have not settled the lawsuits.

6 9.) On March 10, 2011, Mr. Li attempted to use a civil complaint filed by Dennis  
7 Mehravar in examining this witness. When the State objected, Mr. Li withdrew his line of  
8 questioning. The next morning prior to Court, Mr. Li told the State he would not use the lawsuits  
9 until the issue had been briefed with the Court.

10 10.) On March 22, 2011, Mr. Li then used a lawsuit filed by witness Laurie Gennari in  
11 his cross examination of this witness. The State had no prior knowledge of the lawsuit filed by  
12 Ms. Gennari until it was presented by Mr. Li in court on March 22, 2011. This lawsuit was  
13 apparently filed in a California court in September of 2010, three months before the State's  
14 meeting with Mr. Li. According to avowals made by Mr. Li on March 22, 2011, this lawsuit has  
15 not been settled.

16 **II. The Law**

17 **A. State's Disclosure Obligation Under *Brady v. Maryland***

18 Because the defense has a due process right to a fair trial, the prosecution has an  
19 affirmative duty to disclose material exculpatory evidence to the defense. *Brady v. Maryland*,  
20 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 1196-1197 (1963). This includes all evidence that could be used  
21 to impeach a prosecution witness. *United States v. Bagley*, 473 U.S. 667, 676, 105 S.Ct. 3375,  
22 3380 (1985). Rule 15.1(b)(8), Ariz. R. Crim. codifies the State's duties under *Brady* and  
23 requires the State to disclose "[a]ny then existing materials or information which tends to  
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1 mitigate or negate the defendant's guilt as to the offense charged, or which would tend to reduce  
2 the defendant's punishment therefore."

3 The State's obligation to disclose under Rule 15.1 extends to the material and  
4 information in the possession or control of any law enforcement agency or any other person  
5 who has participated in the investigation or evaluation of the case and that is ***under the***  
6 ***prosecutor's direction or control***. Rule 15.1(f), Ariz. R. Crim. P., (emphasis added). The State  
7 is deemed responsible for obtaining and disclosing material and information held by state,  
8 county, and municipal law enforcement agencies that have participated in the investigation of  
9 the case. *See Carpenter v. Superior Court*, 176 Ariz. 486, 489-490, 862 P.2d 246, 249-250  
10 (App. 1993) ("[A] law enforcement agency investigating a criminal action operates as an arm of  
11 the prosecutor for the purposes of obtaining information that falls within the required disclosure  
12 provisions of Rule 15.1.") The State, however, is generally not deemed responsible for  
13 disclosure of information and material held by federal law enforcement agencies, *see State v.*  
14 *Briggs*, 112 Ariz. 379, 383, 542 P.2d 804, 808 (1975), nor crime victims, *see State v. Piper*, 113  
15 Ariz. 390, 555 P.2d 636 (1976), nor other lay witnesses, *see State v. Reinhardt*, 190 Ariz. 579,  
16 951 P.2d 454 (1997) (citing *State v. Kevil*, 111 Ariz. 240, 527 P.2d 285 (1974)). A witness's  
17 cooperation with the State does not make the witness an "agent" of the State for purposes of  
18 discovery. *Reinhardt, supra* (citing *State v. Kevil*, 111 Ariz. 240, 243, 527 P.2d 285, 288  
19 (1974)).  
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23 The State has an obligation to disclose material information not in its possession or  
24 under its control only if (1) the State has better access to the information; (2) the defense shows  
25 that it has made a good faith effort to obtain the information without success; and (3) the  
26 information has been specifically requested by the defendant. *State v. Armstrong*, 208 Ariz. 345,

1 356-357, 93 P.3d 1061, 1072-1073 (2004) (citing *State v. Reinhardt, supra*, at 585-586).

2 “Generally, the State does not have an affirmative duty to seek out and gain possession of  
3 potentially exculpatory evidence.” *State v. Rivera*, 152 Ariz. 507, 511, 733 P.2d 1090, 1094  
4 (1987).

5 **B. Defendant’s Disclosure Obligations**

6 Rule 15.2, Ariz. R. Crim. P., generally governs a defendant’s disclosure in criminal  
7 cases. Rule 15.2(c) requires the defense to provide to the State “[a] list of all papers, documents,  
8 photographs and other tangible objects that the defendant intends to use at trial” . . .  
9 “simultaneously with the notice of defenses submitted under Rule 15.2(b).” Following this  
10 initial disclosure, both parties have a continuing duty to “make additional disclosure,  
11 seasonably, whenever new or different information subject to disclosure is discovered.” *Rule*  
12 *15.6(a), Ariz. R. Crim. P.*

13 **C. The principle of the disclosure rule is the avoidance of undue delay or surprise.**

14 The rules require both the State and the defense to make timely discovery to allow both  
15 sides to investigate and prepare cases for trial or plea agreement. “The underlying principle of  
16 our disclosure rules is the avoidance of undue delay or surprise.” *State v. Reinhardt, supra* at  
17 486, 951 P.2d at 461.

18 Rule 15 is part of a comprehensive system of criminal discovery procedures  
19 promulgated to provide defendants with adequate means to discover material  
20 evidence and to provide notification to each side of the other’s case-in-chief so as  
21 to avoid unnecessary delay and surprise at trial.

22 *Carpenter v. Superior Court*, 176 Ariz. 486, 488, 862 P.2d 246, 248 (App. 1993), citing *State v.*  
23 *Stewart*, 139 Ariz. 50, 59, 676 P.2d 1108, 1117 (1984); *State v. Clark*, 126 Ariz. 428, 432, 616  
24 P.2d 888, 892 (1980), *cert. denied, Clark v. Arizona*, 449 U.S. 1067 (1980).  
25  
26

1 The discovery procedures set forth in Rule 15 are ““designed to enhance the search for  
2 truth in the criminal trial by insuring both the defendant and the State ample opportunity to  
3 investigate certain facts crucial to the determination of guilt or innocence.”” *State v. Lawrence*,  
4 112 Ariz. 20, 22-23, 536 P.2d 1038, 1040-1041 (1975) (quoting *Wardius v. Oregon*, 412 U.S.  
5 470, 474, 93 S.Ct. 2208, 2211, 37 L.Ed.2d 82 (1973)). “The rule, to be effective, must be  
6 applied with equal force to both the prosecution and the defendant.” *Lawrence, Id.* Discovery is  
7 a “two-way street.” *Wardius v. Oregon*, 412 U.S. 470, 475, 93 S.Ct. 2208, 2212, 3 L.Ed.2d 82  
8 (1973).

### 10 C. State’s Motion to Compel disclosure of Civil Lawsuits

11 On March 24, 2011, the State moved this Court for an order compelling Defendant to  
12 disclose all pleadings and all discovery, including requests for admissions (and Defendant’s  
13 answers thereto), interrogatories (and Defendant’s answers thereto) and depositions, for all  
14 lawsuits filed against Defendant, James Arthur Ray, and/or James Ray International arising out  
15 of Spiritual Warrior 2009. The motion was made pursuant to Rule 15.2(g), Ariz. R. Crim. P.  
16 Based on Defendant’s introduction of the content of the complaint filed by Ms. Gennari, the  
17 State requires this information to properly prepare for trial testimony and the information is  
18 readily available to Defendant as a party to the lawsuits.

### 20 III. Argument

#### 21 A. Claims that have been settled by Defendant are clearly not exculpatory.

22 The State agrees that the fact that a witness has filed a lawsuit against a defendant is  
23 relevant to a witness’s motive or bias. However, if a lawsuit is not pending there is no economic  
24 motive with which a party might impeach a witness’s testimony. As explained above, Mr. Li  
25 represented to the State on December 17, 2010 that the lawsuits filed by the victims’ family have  
26

1 been settled. The State was also aware that Defendant had settled the claims with the other  
2 plaintiffs. Mr. Li did not inform the State that a lawsuit had been filed by Laurie Gennari just  
3 three months earlier and that the lawsuit had not been settled.

4 **B. Defendant's settlement of claims prior to trial is admissible as evidence of a witness's**  
5 **bias when testifying.**

6 Rule 408, Ariz. R. Evid., allows the introduction of settlements to prove a witness's bias  
7 or prejudice. The logical inference to draw from the fact that Defendant settled the lawsuits and  
8 claims prior to trial is that he attempted to "buy" the witnesses' silence. In fact, at Defendant's  
9 insistence, each of the settlements contains a confidentiality agreement. To this end, the State  
10 believes that the fact that the claims and lawsuits were settled by Defendant should be admitted  
11 pursuant to Rule 408.

12 **C. The State accurately explained to Court its level of knowledge of lawsuits.**

13 Defendant takes out of context excerpts from the trial transcript, suggesting the State has  
14 misrepresented to the Court its level of knowledge about the various lawsuits. As explained  
15 above, the State knew generally that lawsuits and claims had been filed and settled by Defendant.  
16 The State **did not** know of the lawsuit filed by Laurie Gennari until it was raised in court on  
17 March 22, 2011. The State accurately represented its level of knowledge to this Court.  
18

19 Not included in the portion of the transcript reprinted by Defendant on page three of  
20 Defendant's Motion are the following two discussions wherein the State informed the Court of its  
21 knowledge generally that lawsuits had been filed:  
22

23 THE COURT: Let me ask you in that regard. You don't – you're saying you had  
24 no idea there were lawsuits, is that what you are saying. You had no idea there  
25 were lawsuits.

26 MS. POLK: *The State knows there are lawsuits filed.*

1 Q: You think that would come under a disclosure obligation to have to say that or  
2 are you relying on the fact the defense must have known that also. Because it  
3 would seem the cases indicate the fact that a lawsuit is filed, that is something that  
4 goes to motive or bias. Isn't that something the State would normally disclose  
5 under *Kyle Brady* principles?

6 MS. POLK: Your Honor, not necessarily. But these witnesses have been  
7 interviewed. The defense is the one that attempted to ask them about lawsuits.  
8 Even though their client is a party to the lawsuits. Your Honor, these are lawsuit  
9 that their client is a party to.

10 THE COURT: So you're saying you would not have to disclose that because they  
11 would have had to have known it.

12 MS. POLK: Yes.

13 *Draft Trial Transcript, 3/22/11 at 99: lines 21 -25; 100: lines 1-20 (emphasis added).*

14 A brief time later, the State reiterated it had a general knowledge that lawsuits had been  
15 filed:

16 THE COURT: So you're saying you did not know there were lawsuits filed,  
17 because if you did know then it was in your possession it seems to me.

18 MS. POLK: *Your Honor, the state is aware that lawsuits were filed* and mostly  
19 we learned about it through the defense interviews of witnesses when the  
20 defendant started asking witnesses about lawsuits and kind of probing well, there  
21 is a confidentiality agreement trying to get witnesses to talk about the terms and so  
22 that's how we learned about it. Secondly, the Brady obligation applies to  
23 documents that are in our possession. They've never been in our possession and  
24 thirdly, their client is a party to those lawsuits. Even if somehow the court decided  
25 the state had a Brady obligation to go out and actively find lawsuits.

26 THE COURT: And I didn't say that Ms. Polk. I'm saying if you already knew  
though you had the information. I agree no, you don't have to go out and  
investigate. I don't agree with that proposition. I'll tell you that right now. I don't  
agree that the state has to go out and explore every possibility. But when you have  
information possess that, then that question doesn't even arise.

MS. POLK: Yes and then the next step is under rule 15.2 If you intend to use these  
documents at trial you have to disclose them. Period. You have to disclose them.

*Draft Trial Transcript, 3/22/2011, at 99: lines 21 -25; 100: lines 1-20.*



1       **D.     The information Defendant seeks is not within the State's possession or**  
2       **control.**

3       Defendant argues that the State has an obligation to seek out and obtain exculpatory  
4       information that extends far beyond the plain language of Rule 15.1(f), Ariz. R. Crim., which  
5       states:

6       The prosecutor's obligation under this rule extends to material and information in  
7       the possession or control of any of the following:

8               (1) The prosecutor, or members of the prosecutor's staff, or,

9               (2) Any law enforcement agency which has participated in the  
10              investigation of the case and that is under the prosecutor's direction or control, or,

11              (3) Any other person who has participated in the investigation or evaluation  
12              of the case and who his under the prosecutor's direction or control.

13       Defendant's argument is not supported by the cases cited in his motion. Instead, the cases  
14       reinforce the State's position that it had no obligation to research, obtain and provide to  
15       Defendant evidence of civil lawsuits filed against him by the State's witnesses or to seek out and  
16       provide possible impeachment information relating to Rick Ross.<sup>1</sup>

17       Defendant cites to *United States v. Price*, 566 F.3d 900, 919 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2009), in support of  
18       its claim that the State is "fundamentally incorrect" in its interpretation of Rule 15. 1. *Price*  
19       involved a prosecutor who requested the investigating detective to run a criminal history check on  
20       a key state witness, but failed to learn the results of the check. The witness in fact had a criminal  
21       history that would have allowed the defendant to impeach her testimony. Clearly under these  
22       circumstances and under the parameters set forth in Rule 15.1(f), the investigating detective was  
23       under the control of the prosecutor.  
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<sup>1</sup> The State does not dispute that it has a duty to disclose any felony convictions of the State's  
witnesses. Mr. Ross's prior felony convictions were timely disclosed to Defendant.

1 Defendant further cites to *United States v. Hamilton*, 107 F.3d 499, 509 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997).  
2 But *Hamilton*, like *Price*, also supports the State's position. In *Hamilton*, a bank teller in a  
3 robbery testified he had written down a description of the robber's features immediately after the  
4 crime and given the description to a police officer. This alleged description had never been  
5 disclosed. The prosecutor in the case maintained he had never received the document from the  
6 police. He further indicated he had checked with the police and no one could find a copy of the  
7 description. The Court found no error occurred. Noting that defendant's argument presupposes  
8 the bank teller's written description would have been exculpatory, an assertion the court found  
9 was "at best uncertain," the Court stated "a *Brady* violation does not arise due to nothing more  
10 than a possibility that the undisclosed item might have helped the defense...." *Id.* at 510, citing  
11 *United States v. Agurs*, 427 U.S. 97, 109-110, 96 S.Ct.2392, 2400-2401 (1976).

12  
13 Although the facts in *Hamilton* indicated the description may not have been given to the  
14 police at all, the case involved the investigating agency, which is an agency that Rule 15.1(f)  
15 clearly defines as under the State's control. The court in *Hamilton* rejected the defendant's  
16 argument that the "government's *Brady* obligations include the duty to search its sources for  
17 exculpatory information and turn the information over to the defense." *Id.* at 509-510. Instead, the  
18 court found that "[t]he government will not be found to have suppressed information if that  
19 information was available to the defense through the exercise of reasonable diligence." *Id.* at 510.  
20

21  
22 The cases cited by Defendant to support his argument regarding constructive possession  
23 similarly support the State's position. For example, in *United States v. Reyeros*, 537 F.3d 270,  
24 281-282 (3<sup>rd</sup> Cir. 2008), the court rejected the defendants' argument that the United States  
25 government was "obligated to obtain and produce documents that the government had never seen  
26 and that were in the possession of a foreign sovereign." *Id.* at 279. Specifically the court held:

1 More importantly, though, we could not conclude that the prosecution had  
2 constructive possession of the requested documents in this case even if it could  
3 have acquired them. The mere fact that documents may be obtainable is  
4 insufficient to establish constructive possession. *Without a showing that evidence*  
5 *is possessed by people engaged in the investigation or prosecution of the case, we*  
6 *have declined to hold that the evidence was constructively possessed by federal*  
7 *prosecutors*, despite its being in the possession of another agent of the federal  
8 government and therefore presumably obtainable.

9 *Id.* at 284 (emphasis added).

10 Defendant cites *United States v. Joseph*, 996 F.2d 36 (3<sup>rd</sup> Cir. 1997), yet another case that  
11 does not support Defendant's argument relating to constructive possession. *Joseph* involved  
12 information relating to the State's witnesses that was in the prosecutor's own files in an unrelated  
13 case. The information had possible impeachment value and was never disclosed to the defendants.  
14 Even though the information was clearly in the prosecutor's possession and control, on review the  
15 court found no error. Instead, the court noted the defendants had never made a request for the  
16 specific information at issue and stated, "We will not interpret *Brady* to require prosecutors to  
17 search their unrelated files to exclude the possibility, however remote, that they contain  
18 exculpatory information." *Id.* at 41.

19 Defendant's broad interpretation of the State's disclosure obligation is not supported by  
20 Rule 15.1 or the cases cited in Defendant's motion. The State has no obligation to seek out  
21 exculpatory information for the Defendant that is outside of its possession and control as defined  
22 in Rule 15.1(f).

23 **E. Rule 15.2(c)(3), Ariz. R. Crim. P. is not limited to evidence Defendant will use**  
24 **in its case-in-chief.**

25 Rule 15.2(c)(3), Ariz. R. Crim. P., requires a defendant to disclose to the State "[a] list of  
26 all papers, documents, photographs and other tangible objects that the defendant *intends to use at*  
*trial.*" (emphasis added) Defendant claims the rule applies only to evidence he intends to  
introduce during his case-in-chief and does not apply to evidence he will use during cross-  
examination of the State's witnesses. There is nothing in the plain language set forth above that

1 supports this interpretation. The comment to the rule stating that the disclosure is "*limited to*  
2 *evidence which the defendant will offer at trial*" does not support an interpretation that the  
3 defendant's disclosure obligation only applies to materials introduced in a defendant's case-in-  
4 chief.

5 As noted by Defendant in his motion:

6 [T]he comment to Rule 15.2(b), reflecting principles that extend to all of the  
7 defendant's disclosure obligations, notes that the rule "*is limited to matters as to*  
8 *which the defendant will introduce evidence*." Comment to Ariz. R. Crim. Proc.  
9 15.2(b). 'The limitation is designed to allow the defendant to argue deficiencies in  
10 the state's case (*not requiring the presentation of defense evidence*) without prior  
11 warning, and to make his disclosure obligations sufficiently clear and predictable."

12 *Defendant's Motion to Compel Disclosure of Brady Material at 9* (emphasis added). Rule  
13 16(b)(A) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure governs a defendant's disclosure obligations  
14 and explicitly limits the scope of disclosure to items a defendant intends to use his case-in-chief at  
15 trial. The Arizona rule contains no such limiting language.

16 It is clear from the plain language of the rule and the comments to both Rule 15.2(b) and  
17 Rule 15.2(c)(3) that Defendant's disclosure obligation extends to all evidence the Defendant  
18 intends to introduce at trial whether introduced during Defendant's case-in-chief or in his cross-  
19 examination of the State's witnesses.

20 Although a comment may clarify a rule's ambiguous language, a comment cannot  
21 otherwise alter the clear text of a rule. Cf. *Janson v. Christensen*, 167 Ariz. 470,  
22 471, 808 P.2d 1222k, 1223 (1991) (stating that "we follow fundamental principles  
23 of statutory construction, the cornerstone of which is the rule that the best and  
24 most reliable index of a statute's meaning is its language and, when the language is  
25 clear and unequivocal, it is determinative of the statute's construction.")

26 *State v. Aguilar*, 209 Ariz. 40, 48, 97 P.2d 865, 873 (2004)

Defendant claims the lawsuits filed against Defendant are being used solely for  
impeachment and are not intended to be moved into evidence; therefore, advance disclosure is not

1 required. If this was an accurate representation of what is occurring at trial, the State would agree  
2 with Defendant. However, with regard to Ms. Gennari, Defendant read into the record extensive  
3 excerpts from the complaint filed against Defendant. This approach necessitated the State doing  
4 the same and the complaint was ultimately admitted by the stipulation of the parties. As noted in  
5 the comment to Rule 15.2(b) cited above, the limitation is designed to allow the defendant to  
6 argue deficiencies in the state's case (*not requiring the presentation of defense evidence*)  
7 without prior warning. Pursuant to Rule 15.2(c)(3), Ariz. R. Crim. P., the State is entitled to  
8 advance notice of the evidence that will be presented either orally through the reading of a civil  
9 complaint or through the admission of the complaint during trial.

11 **F. The information requested by Defendant has either been disclosed, is not**  
12 **subject to disclosure, or is not in the possession and control of the State as defined in Rule**  
13 **15.1(f).**

14 The State has disclosed all material in its possession or control bearing on the bias or  
15 credibility of its witnesses. The State has disclosed the prior convictions of State's witness Rick  
16 Ross. The State has previously informed Defendant that it does not have information in its  
17 possession or control relating to any other possible impeachment evidence relating to Mr. Ross.  
18 Moreover, the State has made Mr. Ross available for an interview. It is clear from Defendant's  
19 questioning of Mr. Ross that Defendant has in his possession the information he is insisting the  
20 State has a duty to seek out and disclose. The State has no greater access to this information than  
21 Defendant. Finally, Defendant cites no authority that requires the State to disclose "[a]ll  
22 communications, whether written or oral, between the prosecution and the civil attorneys for the  
23 government witnesses in their complaints against Mr. Ray." The State has received some  
24 communications from civil attorneys containing materials it has found to be subject to disclosure  
25 and has in fact made disclosure of these communications. (See State's 12th Supplemental  
26

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
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1 Disclosure, "Statement Under Oath of Sandra Andretti," Bates No. 5238-5375; State's 30<sup>th</sup>  
2 Supplemental Disclosure, "Shore v. Ray Family Damages Summary," Bates No. 6758-6858; and  
3 State's 41<sup>st</sup> Supplemental Disclosure, "Liz Neuman's Biographical Data," Bates No. 7784-7787.)  
4

5 **IV. Conclusion**

6 The Defendant claims the State has an obligation to seek out and disclose exculpatory  
7 evidence that is not under the State's possession or control as defined in Rule 15.1(f), Ariz. R.  
8 Crim. P. Arizona law and the cases cited by Defendant do not support Defendant's  
9 interpretation. The State has reviewed the evidence in its possession and has disclosed to the  
10 defense anything that is arguably exculpatory. Should any additional materials in information  
11 come into the State's possession or control, the State will timely disclose. Accordingly, the  
12 State respectfully requests this Court deny Defendant's Motion to Compel Disclosure of Brady  
13 Material.  
14

15 RESPECTFULLY submitted this 4<sup>th</sup> day of April, 2011.  
16  
17

18 By   
19 SHEILA SULLIVAN POLK  
20 YAVAPAI COUNTY ATTORNEY

21 **COPIES** of the foregoing delivered this  
22 4<sup>th</sup> day of April, 2011, to

23 Hon. Warren Darrow  
24 Judge of the Superior Court

25 Thomas Kelly  
26

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